Alaco

29.10.2013 | Georgia’s Elections

When discussing politics in the post-Soviet space, Western editorials often opt for one of two lines: either the country in question is becoming part of Russia’s sphere of influence; or it is joining the long line of EU candidate nations.

On Sunday 27th October, Georgian Dream coalition candidate Georgy Margvelashvili won the first round of the Georgian Presidential Elections convincingly.  According to exit polls which have since been recognised by previous incumbent Mikheil Saakashvili and opposition candidate David Bakradze who represents Saakashvili’s United National Movement, Margvelashvili took 62.11% of the vote.

In an election described by EU Foreign Minister Catherine Ashton’s spokesman as “a very positive picture” and judged by the head of the OSCE Observer Mission to be “a clean election” representing “the will of the people”, the result was greeted cautiously in many UK newspapers.  Western coverage also largely ignored the fact that constitutional changes in Georgia mean that the Presidency has now become more of a figure-head position.  However, in the context of a country that has lost 20% of its sovereign territory to Russian-backed break-away enclaves and only a decade ago suffered from large sale state-sponsored corruption, this peaceful transition of power is nothing short of remarkable. 

Interestingly, a view expressed by Russian-language regional commentators has been that the election was unusually prosaic, with the candidates espousing essentially similar foreign policy: that of improving ties with Russia whilst continuing along the path to NATO and EU membership.  The results themselves were also long predicted, with the only surprise that the third-placed candidate, Nino Burzhanadze, received only 10.18% of the vote, perhaps lower than expected due to her time as a Saakashvili minister. 

One Russian newspaper declared the election, “The End of Charismatic Politicians” with a Georgian sociologist saying that the apathy caused by the elections had indeed bought Georgia closer to “civilised Europe”.  Khatuna Lagazidze, founder of the Centre for European Values, whilst praising the elections for their lack of vitriol, described the candidates as “dull and short of content”.  Given the changes in Georgia over the last 20 years however, such banality is perhaps to be welcomed, or even applauded. 

This said, the Georgian political situation remains irrevocably coloured by the controversial figure of Saakashvili, who introduced sweeping reforms during his 10-year Presidency having come to power on the back of the 2003 Rose Revolution, the first of the so-called “colour” revolutions that swept across the former Soviet Union.  His time in power can arguably be split into pre- and post-2008 eras.  Before Georgia’s August 2008 military offensive against South Ossetia, the country had reformed radically.  Changes to its police force were hailed in particular after the entire force was sacked, a nation-wide anti-corruption drive launched, and, as a result of the reforms, the country has now risen to 8th in the World Bank Group’s 2014 Ease of Business ranking. 

Yet after 2008 Saakashvili was accused of increasing arrogance, undue influence over the judiciary, authoritarian tendencies, and brutal treatment of opposition figures.  For a man who rose to power with over 95% of the popular vote, his 25% approval rating in the first half of 2013 made grim reading.  However, the process that started in Georgia in November 2003 following protests against Eduard Shevardnadze’s government on the back of rigged parliamentary elections, appears to have come to fruition last Sunday.

The broad-brush rhetoric too often used when discussing the post-Soviet landscape is in need of being updated, and with it perhaps analysis of the future of EU-Georgian, EU-Armenian, and ultimately EU-Russian relations.  With regards to the Georgian Dream coalition, more likely than a lurch to the East is arguably its potential fragmentation due to the sheer variety of political views represented in the faction.  It is therefore perhaps better to see the electorate’s choice in Georgia as having been between an unpopular previous government and a promise of the ‘new’, rather than simply between Russia to the East and Europe to the West.